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Abstract
We compare the ex ante observable risk characteristics, the default performance, and the
pricing of securitized mortgage loans and mortgage loans retained by the original lender. We ﬁnd
that privately securitized ﬁxed and adjustable-rate mortgages are riskier ex ante than lender-
retained loans or loans securitized through the government sponsored agencies. We do not
ﬁnd any evidence of diﬀerential loan performance for privately securitized ﬁxed-rate mortgages.
However, we do ﬁnd evidence that privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages performed
worse than retained mortgages, even after controlling for a large number of risk factors. Despite
the higher measures of ex ante risk, the loan rates on privately securitized adjustable-rate
mortgages were lower than for retained mortgages.
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11 Introduction
Mortgage markets have undergone a steady process of change over the period since the ﬁnancial
industry deregulation in the 1980s and up through the ﬁnancial crisis. One of the more impor-
tant developments over this period was the process of disintermediation that occurred through the
growth of loan securitization, whereby many lenders chose to specialize in the production of mort-
gage loans, but not to maintain a lasting exposure to the loans after passing them on to investors.
In light of the extremely high mortgage default rates observed after the U.S. housing market peaked
in 2006, there has been a keen interest in whether there were links between the ways mortgage loans
were funded and their eventual performance. In this paper, we compare the ex ante risk charac-
teristics, the default performance, and the pricing of mortgage loans that were securitized through
a private (i.e., nonagency) channel, versus loans that were securitized through the government-
sponsored agencies (GSEs) or retained in a lender’s portfolio. To preview the results, we ﬁnd that,
on balance, lenders chose to privately securitize mortgages that appear to have been observably
riskier than the loans they retained in their own portfolios. In terms of default experience, we ﬁnd
little evidence of diﬀerential loan performance for ﬁxed-rate mortgages (FRMs). There appears to
be some evidence that default rates were higher for privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs), although we maintain, however, that other observable risk factors better explain the pat-
terns of mortgage default in our data. We cannot attribute the diﬀerential loan performance of the
ARMs to heterogeneity that was unobservable to us but observable to lenders and therefore would
have been expected to be priced, given some positive ex ante probability of retention.
The literature has identiﬁed numerous reasons for loan securitizations and for mortgage loan
securitizations, in particular. These reasons, with their varying theoretical implications for the
relative riskiness of securitized versus retained loans, motivate our empirical investigation of the
ex ante risk characteristics and ex post performance of these loan categories. In addition, they
guide our selection of control variables for our securitization regressions and provide an informal
framework within which to discuss the empirical correlates of securitization.
Perhaps the simplest motive for lenders to securitize is the desire to generate fee income and
maintain the funding ﬂexibility needed to increase lending or manage the lender’s leverage position.
2In the so-called “originate-to-distribute” model, lenders eﬀectively fund a portion of their operations
through the capital markets, selling their mortgages to investors shortly after origination (see Pavel
and Phillis (1987) and Karaoglu (2005)). To the extent that mortgage credit risk depends closely on
house prices, loan securitization also may help locally or regionally tied lenders oﬄoad or diversify
away geographically-based risks. Note that neither of these aforementioned securitization motives
have an obvious implication for loan performance, although reputational concerns may motivate
lenders who want to reliably generate fee income or diversify away geographically-based risks to
securitize their less risky loans.
Another possibility is that lenders may want to securitize mortgage loans in order to reduce
their regulatory capital ratios. This motive would be particularly relevant for regulated commercial
banks. Throughout most of our sample period (2000-2007), regulatory capital rules stipulated a
one-size-ﬁts-all capital charge for mortgage loans on a bank’s books. If those capital charges were
perceived by lenders to be too high, then, all else held constant, banks would have an incentive to
securitize their lower-risk mortgages while retaining the higher-risk loans for which the regulatory
capital charge is closer to optimal.1
Yet another reason for loan securitization comes from the observation that there are signiﬁcant
informational asymmetries present throughout the lending and securitization process. Over the
course of the loan application and screening process, lenders can potentially collect valuable infor-
mation about borrower default risk that is not necessarily passed along to investors if the mortgages
are securitized. Lenders may exploit this informational advantage and pass on “lemons” to investors
while retaining the safer loans in their own portfolio. (See, for example, Carey (1998), with a fo-
cus on corporate bonds.) The asymmetric information story of securitization, then, yields a risk
implication that is the opposite of the likely risk implications of the fee income, diversiﬁcation,
or regulatory capital management stories. In a recent paper, Elul (2011) ﬁnds some evidence of
diﬀerential loan performance consistent with the asymmetric information story in certain mortgage
product types.
Securitization may also undermine a lender’s incentives to screen borrowers, as these activities
1See, for example, Jones (2004), Dionne and Harchaoui (2003), Minton, Sanders, and Strahan (2004), Nolan
(2005), and Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Sanders (2003).
3are costly, and lenders may not directly beneﬁt from heightened screening of loans that likely will
be securitized. The screening story has been investigated in a recent paper by Keys, Mukherjee,
Seru, and Vig (2010), wherein the authors make use of an industry rule-of-thumb that loans to
borrowers with FICO credit scores just below 620 are more diﬃcult to securitize than loans with
scores just above this threshold. Given this discrete jump in the probability that the loan can be
sold, the authors reason that lenders have a stronger incentive to produce “soft” information in order
to better discriminate between good and bad credit risks for loans to borrowers with FICO scores
below 620 than above 620. In turn, the authors ﬁnd that, despite the normally negative correlation
between FICO scores and credit risk, delinquency rates are lower for borrowers just below the 620
FICO cutoﬀ for a large sample of securitized mortgages. The authors contend that this reﬂects
lenders’ stronger incentive to produce information for the less highly securitized group. If, indeed,
lenders do take advantage of private information to pass along lemons to private investors, then
we should see higher default rates for privately securitized mortgages, after controlling for risk
characteristics that investors should have been able to observe.
In this paper, we examine three basic issues related to securitization. First, we use a large loan-
level data set to explore the factors that are associated with securitization. Second, we compare
the default performance of securitized versus retained mortgage loans, both unconditionally and
conditioned on the same risk factors that we explore in connection with the securitization decision,
as well as important control variables. Third, we compare the conditional pricing of securitized
mortgages and mortgages retained in the portfolio to see whether we can detect any diﬀerential
pricing of loans that eventually end up in securitizations.
To answer these questions we use a very rich data set of California mortgages that allows us to
gain insight into mortgage terms, borrower characteristics, and measures of the amount of lender
competition in the market. California is an excellent laboratory for investigating these questions.
California has a large and highly diverse economy and is characterized by equally diverse local
real estate markets. California had some of the best and worst-performing markets (in terms of
mortgage default rates) in the country. In addition, the level of house prices in California is quite a
4bit higher than for the overall country.2 As such, the conforming loan limits set by the GSEs tend
to be binding for a larger segment of the California market than for other states. Thus, innovations
that made mortgage lending through the private securitization process more attractive likely had
a relatively large impact on the origination of mortgage debt in California.
Our paper diﬀers from that of Elul (2011) in several respects. First and most important,
we examine the relative pricing of securitized mortgages. Even if securitized mortgages default
at a higher rate than retained mortgages, lenders would not appear to be knowingly exploiting
asymmetric information to oﬄoad risk to investors unless it is also true, given some positive ex
ante probability of retention, that such loans carry higher interest rates. In this paper, we use the
interest rate on the mortgage as a rough proxy for investors’ returns. We test whether, for example,
the higher default rate for securitized than for retained ARMs is reﬂected in a higher loan interest
rate. We ﬁnd that it is not–the interest rate is, in fact, lower–and we argue that this result is
not consistent with lenders knowingly exploiting asymmetric information or engaging in diﬀerential
screening. Second, we estimate an empirical model of the securitization decision as a function of
observable risk factors. Elul (2011) does not examine the securitization decision. We ﬁnd that, ex
ante, securitized mortgages look riskier than retained mortgages. This result serves as a robustness
check on our default results and their interpretation. For example, we ﬁnd that, conditional on
observable risk factors, securitized ARMs default at a higher rate than retained ARMs, suggesting
that lenders oﬄoad risk to investors. If we had found that, ex ante, securitized ARMs look safer
than retained, we would be more likely to question our default results and interpretation, for they
would imply an implausible ability of lenders to privately identify and proﬁtably sell more risky safe
looking mortgages than risky risky looking mortgages. Third, we include measures of prepayment
risk in our default regressions. Finally, we emphasize that, although securitized ARMs default at
a higher rate than retained ARMs, factors other than securitization are much more important in
explaining their relative performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we oﬀer a brief overview of the
private-label securitization process. In Section 3, we describe the data used in the empirical analysis.
2According to the California Association of Realtors the median single-family house price in California in 2007
was $476,000, above the prevailing conforming loan limit of $417,000 at that time.
5Section 6 presents the results from our securitization regressions. Section 5 contains the analysis of
the comparative default experience of securitized and nonsecuritized mortgages. Section 6 contains
price regressions. Section 7 concludes.
2 The private-label securitization process
Securitization is the process by which originated loans are combined and repackaged for sale to
capital market investors. There are two diﬀerent channels through which residential mortgages
are securitized in the United States. Agency securitizations are issued through the government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.3 Nonagency
securitizations, or private-label securitizations, are issued by entities other than the GSEs, usually
large banks or Wall Street ﬁrms. The private-label securitization process results in the transfor-
mation of whole mortgage loans into publicly-traded securities which are registered through the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The main diﬀerence between agency and private-label securitizations is in the credit risk of the
underlying mortgages. The GSEs fully guarantee the timely repayment of principal and interest
of their securitizations. Because the GSEs have traditionally been viewed by market participants
as enjoying the backing of the U.S. government, strict criteria were put in place in an attempt
to limit the amount of credit risk taken on by the GSEs. These criteria included caps on the
size of the individual mortgages that the GSEs can buy (the conforming loan limits), as well as
other underwriting guidelines applied to the amount of borrower leverage in place and the ratio of
borrowers’ scheduled monthly debt repayment to income. In essence, the nonagency market grew
up to absorb the demand for mortgages that were “nonconforming”, either in terms of their size or
because of some violation of one or several underwriting criteria. According to Bruskin, Sanders,
and Sykes (1999), the ﬁrst private-label mortgage security was issued by Bank of America in 1977.
But the real growth in the market took place in the 2000s. According to the Federal Reserve’s
Flow of Funds data, private securitizations accounted for about 14% of all residential mortgage
securitizations in 2000.Q1. By 2006, the private-label share had risen to 36%.
3We exclude mortgages securitized through Ginnie Mae from our data set.
6At a conceptual level, the process of privately securitizing residential mortgages is relatively
simple; lenders extend mortgage credit to borrowers, and then sell the loans so that they may be
repackaged and sold on to investors. In practice, however, specialization has led to the inclusion of
a large number of economic agents that are party to the securitization process. Figure 1 contains
a general schematic of the various parties involved in a mortgage transaction that eventually ends
up in a securitization. In brief, originators extend ﬁnancing to borrowers, or mortgagors. If the
originator is a depository institution such as a commercial bank, then it is possible initially to
ﬁnance the loan through deposits. Alternatively, the originator may ﬁnance its lending through
short-term loans from a warehouse lender. After origination, an arranger, or sponsor, buys the
mortgage loans from the originator and proceeds to sell the mortgages to a bankruptcy-remote
trust. The arranger then packages the mortgages into securities, obtains a rating for the securities
by one of the major credit rating agencies, and then sells the securities to outside investors. As
borrowers make interest and principal payments, a servicer passes the cash ﬂows on to investors in
accordance with the terms laid out in the securities prospectus.4
Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) point out that the parties in each of the interactions listed
above have potentially diﬀerent information about the quality of the underlying mortgages.5 Orig-
inators perform the original underwriting on the loans and (presumably) verify the borrower’s
income, employment history, credit score, and other information, to the extent that veriﬁcation is
required by the arrangers. Arrangers issue underwriting guidelines to the originators stating param-
eters needed to be satisﬁed for any loan purchase. Arrangers do not typically “re-underwrite” the
loans in the pool. Instead, arrangers are protected through representations and warranties made
by the originator that the mortgages were not originated in violation of any consumer protection
laws, that the mortgages were not fraudulently misrepresented, or that the mortgagors were not
4For example, a “plain-vanilla” security might stipulate that an investor is entitled to a pro-rata share of the
cash ﬂows generated by the pool of mortgages owned by the trust. Alternatively, the claims on the assets may be
structured, in which case investors in diﬀerent securities have diﬀerent priority to the cash ﬂows on the underlying
mortgages.
5Losses due to borrower default may not necessarily be borne by investors in the private-label securitizations.
The arrangers may have “over-collateralized” the structure by setting the par value of the securities below the face
value of the underlying mortgages, thus building in some buﬀer for losses. Alternatively, the arrangers may have
purchased some limited insurance to cover losses. Either way, the focus here is on the diﬀerent information produced
by the originator relative to the arrangers and, in turn, to the investors.
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already in default. Originators are under obligation to buy back loans found to be in breach of the
representations and warranties. Of course, the representations and warranties provide a solution to
this potential agency problem only insofar as the originator is in good enough ﬁnancial condition
to repurchase the loans.
The potential information asymmetries between the originators and the eventual investors help
motivate our empirical investigation of the characteristics and default rates of privately securitized
mortgages relative to those of retained mortgages. In particular, we will investigate the correlation
between ex ante observable risk factors and the private securitization decision. In addition, we will
examine the degree to which these risk factors can account for any diﬀerential between realized
default rates and therefore the degree to which asymmetric information may play a role.
3 Data
Our data set consists of information on the characteristics, terms, and eventual performance of
more than 1.6 million ﬁrst-lien conventional mortgage loans originated between January 1, 2000
8and December 31, 2007, for properties in California. The data come from LPS Applied Analytics,
which collects data from the major mortgage servicers.6
Importantly, LPS reports the “investor type” for each loan in its database as the loan moves
through time. Thus, we are able to discern between loans that were sold to the GSEs (Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac), sold to investors through a private securitization, or retained on the originating
institution’s balance sheet. In practice, the identity of the investor can change over time. In the
ﬁrst few months of a loan’s life, for example, the investor is typically identiﬁed as the originator,
which retains ownership of the loan throughout the “warehousing” period. The investor identity
then changes as these loans leave the balance sheet of the originator and proceed through the
securitization process. Investor type can change even after the initial warehousing period if, for
example, a loan is securitized and then bought back (or returned) by the originator. The convention
used in this paper is to make a once-and-for-all assignment of the investor type, which is based on
the investor identity six months after the loan origination.
The loan-level data in our sample allow us to identify the location of the property backing the
mortgage and thereby to include a measure of lending competition for the market in which the
house is located. Thus, in some of the the default and pricing speciﬁcations, we include a simple
concentration measure, the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), based on bank deposit data for the
metropolitan area in which the property resides. We also include the last two years of house price
appreciation in the zip code of the property in several of our speciﬁcations. The zip code-level data
are from the Home Value Indices constructed by Zillow. Given that we see a strong persistence of
house prices in our data, we include this variable to account for possible lender optimism about
house price appreciation at a very local level.
About 82% of the sample consists of loans that were securitized in some way–either privately
or through the GSEs (see Table 1). In aggregate, securitization decreased over most of the sample
period (see Figure 2). However, this trend masks large shifts that took place in the means by which
securitization was achieved. In 2000, only about 20% of California mortgages were securitized
privately. By 2005, the private securitization rate had almost doubled. This growth in private
6In LPS’s marketing literature, they claim that their participating servicers account for about 60% of the entire
mortgage market.
9securitization coincided with rapid house price appreciation in California.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample 2002 Originations 2006 Originations
mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Securitized .817 .906 .772
Privately securitized .311 .258 .383
Loan Purpose: Reﬁnance .762 .859 .690
Jumbo .278 .171 .339
ARM .387 .211 .568
Option ARM .231 .124 .374
Loan amount $331,713 $273,734 $237,359 $188,625 $423,547 $333,207
Loan-to-value .618 .187 .575 .189 .646 .182
Subprime .034 .001 .095
FICO 723 56 734 53 715 58
Low documentation .389 .306 .510
Local HHI (deposits) 1,071 276 1,079 263 1,027 299
2-yr House price apprec. .345 .21 .268 .136 .317 .200
Delinquent 60+ days .057 .016 .147
Observations 1,643,082 94,292 207,041
In Table 1, we highlight additional changes, focusing ﬁrst on 2002 and then 2006, when house
prices peaked in California. For example, with house prices increasing faster than the the GSE con-
forming loan limits over this period, we see the share of jumbo loans (larger than the conforming
loan limit) increasing from about 17% in 2002 to 34% in 2006. A change in borrower preferences
for ARMs versus ﬁxed-rate mortgages apparently also accompanied this pressure on home aﬀord-
ability. Indeed, even option ARMs, or ARMs where borrowers are able to negatively amortize their
mortgages for a set period of time, gained in popularity as the housing boom progressed.
We also see some evidence of a decline in underwriting standards. For example, LTVs moved up
modestly over the sample period. The subprime share of total originations climbed from about 1%
to a peak of 10% in 2006. The incidence of less-than-full documentation of borrower income and
assets increased over the period as well. Other sample statistics as well are presented in Table 1.
In Table 2, we recast the sample summary statistics in order to show how the key variables in
the data vary across investor type. Obviously, there are large diﬀerences between the mortgages
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sold to the GSEs on the one hand and mortgages either retained by lenders or securitized through
the private-label channel on the other hand. It is perhaps surprising to see that the GSEs hold
any jumbo mortgages, or mortgages with nonconforming features such as option ARMs. We can
conjecture that these mortgages were not part of a GSE-securitization, but rather were originally
privately securitized and then purchased by the GSEs and held in their portfolios.
The other interesting feature of Table 2 is the similarity of many of the mortgage characteristics
across retained and privately securitized mortgages. In terms of the major risk factors thought
to contribute to default—LTV, FICO score, documentation status–it is not obvious from these
statistics that lenders systematically withheld safe mortgages from the market for retention in
their portfolios. The one exception is the case of the subprime indicator. Clearly, the private-
label securitization channel was the primary way in which subprime mortgage loans were ﬁnanced
in California over this time period. And, as we’ll see below, there are statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences at the margins even in terms of the other risk factors between privately securitized and
retained mortgages.
11Table 2: Risk and Default Characteristics of Securitized vs. Retained Loans
GSE securitized Private securitized Retained
mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean st. dev
Loan Purpose: Reﬁnance .848 .690 .762
Jumbo .011 .545 .566
ARM .152 .546 .769
Option ARM .067 .345 .493
Loan amount $217,610 $89,926 $420,163 $273,487 $497,016 $426,736
Loan-to-value .569 .192 .661 .169 .680 .167
Subprime 0.0 .092 .029
FICO 728 54 718 57 716 57
Low/no documentation .325 .423 .511
Local HHI (deposits) 1,067 281 1,074 271 1,076 268
2-yr House price apprec. .351 .19 .359 .209 .306 .218
Delinquent 60+ days .026 .100 .069
Observations 831,450 511,287 300,345
4 Determinants of securitization
In this section we estimate multivariate logit regressions of the propensity of lenders to securitize
mortgages. Our focus in this paper is on the relative risk consequences of the lender’s decision
regarding whether or not to securitize through a private-label transaction. However, recognizing
all three possibilities for the allocation of mortgages–retention, private securitization, or agency
securitization–we estimate the following regressions in a competing risks framework.
The multivariate analysis allows us to control for various factors in order to provide a richer
and clearer picture of the correlates of the securitization decision. To handle outliers, we winsorize
all of the continuous variables in the regressions. We also include a complete set of time-MSA
interaction dummies in each speciﬁcation, and we cluster the standard errors by MSA. We include
both purchase loans and reﬁnance loans.7
The speciﬁcations in Table 3, pertaining to private securitizations, and Table 4, pertaining to
agency securitizations, are organized by grouping the explanatory variables into types. Variables
of the ﬁrst two types, loan characteristics (Jumbo, ARM, Option ARM, Loan-to-value), and bor-
rower characteristics (Subprime, FICO, Low/no documentation), measure the riskiness of the loan.
Variables of the third type, bank characteristics (equity capital-to-asset ratio categories and nonper-
7We estimated the models separately for purchases and reﬁnances, and the results were very similar.
12forming loan ratio categories), measure the propensity of the lender to securitize due to a constraint
on portfolio lending by way of regulatory minima on capital-to-asset ratios. 8 The remaining vari-
able, Past two-year house price appreciation, also measures riskiness, but at a market level. During
the period under study, areas with rapid house price appreciation tended to subsequently witness
rapid depreciation. The reported coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects. For continuous variables (Loan-
to-value, FICO, and house price appreciation), the reported marginal eﬀects measure the change in
the probability of securitization due to a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable,
evaluated at the means of all of the explanatory variables. For dummy variables (Jumbo, ARM,
option ARM, Subprime, Low/no documentation, equity ratio categories, and nonperforming loan
ratio categories), the marginal eﬀects measure the change in the probability of securitization due
to a change in the dummy variable from zero to one.
Positive correlations between higher risk and private securitization pervade the marginal eﬀects
seen in Table 3. The risk-based speciﬁcations, columns (i), (ii), and(iv), indicate that a mortgage is
more likely to be privately securitized, as opposed to retained, if it is jumbo, has an ARM or option
ARM interest rate structure, or has little or no documentation. In addition, LTV is positively
correlated with private securitization.
As expected, banks with equity ratios lower than the 75th percentile are more likely to privately
securitize their mortgages, as are banks with nonperforming loan ratios above the 75th percentile.
In general, the regression results from the separate category speciﬁcations are robust to the
inclusion of additional variables. Only the low documentation variable has a statistically signiﬁcant
marginal eﬀect in one of the more parsimonious speciﬁcations (positive in column (ii)) that is the
opposite of a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in a combined speciﬁcation (negative in column (v)).
8We constructed the equity ratio and nonperforming loan ratio variables as follows. We calculated the means of
each of these variables for each lender, with the mean taken over that lender’s closing dates. The low, low-mid, and
high-mid equity ratio and nonperforming loan ratio variables in the regressions are dummies indicating the positions
in the sample distributions of these means of the actual values of the lender’s equity ratio and nonperforming loan
ratio at the time of loan closing–below the 25th percentile, between the 25th and 50th percentiles, and between the
50th and 75th percentiles, respectively. Thus, the coeﬃcients on these variables indicate the marginal eﬀect on the
probability of securitization of moving from a value of the corresponding variable that is above the 75th percentile to
a lower value. Note that it is not true that, for example, 25 percent of the loans in the sample have a value of 1 for
"low equity ratio." In fact, only about 11 percent do. This is because banks with higher mean equity ratios tend to
originate more mortgages than banks with lower mean equity ratios and/or banks tend to originate more mortgages
when their equity ratios are high relative to their own equity ratios at other times.
13And even this inconsistency is mild, in that the statistical signiﬁcance of the negative marginal
eﬀect is weak and does not persist in the last two, more general speciﬁcations. In the last two
speciﬁcations, columns (vi) and (vii), the marginal eﬀect of the low documentation variable is not
statistically signiﬁcant at all.9 One other variable, ARM, also has a statistically signiﬁcant marginal
eﬀect in its category regression (column (i)), but not in the full speciﬁcation. Perhaps, once we
control for other factors, the attractiveness of retaining ARMs due to their short durations, which
facilitate a better balance with short-term liabilities, increases in dominance.
Except for low documentation and ARM, marginal eﬀects that appeared as statistically sig-
niﬁcant in the category regressions remain so in each of the combined speciﬁcations in which the
variable appears. Two variables, FICO and house price appreciation, do not show statistically sig-
niﬁcant marginal eﬀects in their respective category regressions (columns (ii) and (iv)). However,
their marginal eﬀects appear as highly statistically signiﬁcant in all other speciﬁcations that include
them. The positive coeﬃcients on FICO indicate that privately securitized mortgages tended to
have higher borrower credit scores than retained mortgages. This turns out to be a consequence of
the mix of FICO scores in the privately securitized loan pools. In eﬀect, private market investors
were willing to hold two kinds of mortgages that were being produced in ample quantity over this
time period: low FICO score subprime loans and higher FICO score alt-A loans where borrower
attributes were better (safer) but some other risk factor rendered the loan nonconforming.10 The
positive coeﬃcient on house price appreciation in column (vii) indicates the expected correlation
with risk.
In summary, what emerges from the models of the private securitization choice is a general pic-
ture of lenders selling oﬀ loans that appear to be marginally riskier than the loans that are retained.
This diﬀerential risk in the loans will be important when evaluating the eventual performance of
the mortgages.
Although our focus is on the private securitization decision, we also present the results of the
multivariate logit regression for agency securitizations, in Table 4. Here, the general picture is one
9The appearance of equal marginal eﬀects and standard errors for low documentation in columns (vi) and (vii),
accompanied by diﬀering signiﬁcance levels, is due to rounding.
10For example, in California at this time, many alt-A loans were labeled thus because the loan amounts exceeded
the GSE’s conforming loan limits, or sometimes the borrower debt-to-income or LTV ratios were considered too high.
14of lenders selling oﬀ loans that appear to be marginally safer than the loans that are retained.
Except for FICO, the signs of the marginal eﬀects for each of the variables in the full speciﬁcation
in Table 4 are the opposite of those in the full speciﬁcation in Table 3.
155 Determinants of Mortgage Delinquencies
While the results of the previous section provide insights into the relationships between mortgage
securitization and loan, borrower, market, and lender characteristics, they have unclear implications
for the performance of securitized relative to retained loans. Privately securitized mortgages appear
to be riskier in observable ways: the borrowers associated with the securitized mortgages are more
likely to be subprime borrowers and tend to have higher LTVs. The strategy employed in the
analysis of mortgage default below is twofold. First, we would like to identify the key determinants
of mortgage default in our sample. Second, we would like to control for observable risk factors as
best we can so as to focus on the relative performance of the securitized and retained mortgages.
On this front, the biggest challenge is to properly control for changes in the value of the underlying
collateral. Common sense and theory all suggest a role for house price changes as key determinants
behind the default decision. However, we observe the value of the house only at the time of the
loan origination. Thereafter, we can only estimate the current LTV by applying the appreciation
(or depreciation) observed in a local house price index to the original appraised value of the house
and divide by the remaining loan balance. If a local housing market is fairly homogeneous, then
our index-based estimates of home values will be reliable. To attempt to control for market-speciﬁc
heterogeneity, we include Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) ﬁxed eﬀects in all of our empirical
speciﬁcations.
Unconditionally, privately-securitized mortgages do appear to have higher delinquency rates
than both retained mortgages and mortgages that end up in agency securitizations. As seen in
Table 2, the delinquency rate on privately securitized loans in our sample, at about 8%, is notably
higher than the 6% default rate for retained loans. Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function
for loans with diﬀerent investor types show that the privately securitized mortgages defaulted
earlier, on average, than retained loans or loans securitized through the GSEs (see Figure 3).
To investigate the performance of the loans in our sample more carefully we follow the literature
and model the default event with a competing risks hazard model. In this setting, mortgage histories
can terminate in two competing ways. The mortgage can fall into default status, which we deﬁne to
be the event that a borrower becomes more than 60 days past due on his or her mortgage payment.
16Table 3: Multinomial logit models of securitization–privately securitized
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Jumbo .752 .750 .799 .814
(.011)*** (.010)*** (.009)*** (.011)***
ARM .049 .015 .025 .025
(.017)*** (.013) (.016) (.016)
Option ARM .128 .098 .107 .108
(.013)*** (.010)*** (.014)*** (.014)***
Loan-to-value .131 .066 .094 .080
(.017)*** (.009)*** (.010)*** (.013)***
Subprime 1.25 1.22 1.24 1.23
(.043)*** (.024)*** (.027)*** (.029)***
FICO 2.10e(-5) 2.21e(-4) 8.85e(-5) 1.37e(-4)
(9.57e(-5)) (4.81e(-5))*** (3.38e(-5))*** (4.26e(-5))***
Low/no documentation .056 -.016 .012 .012
(.003)*** (.010)* (.007)* (.007)
Low equity ratio .185 .317 .324
(.006)*** (.014)*** (.013)***
Low-mid equity ratio .184 .310 .315
(.009)*** (.017)*** (.017)***
High-mid equity ratio .266 .440 .444
(.009)*** (.017)*** (.017)***
Low nonperforming loan ratio -.192 -.243 -.250
(.011)*** (.013)*** (.013)***
Low-mid nonperforming loan ratio -.303 -.385 -.392
(.010)*** (.016)*** (.018)***
High-mid nonperforming loan ratio -.338 -.478 -.484
(.014)*** (.022)*** (.024)***
Past 2yr house price apprec. -.085 .266
(.071) (.040)***
Pseudo R2 .302 .089 .076 .052 .320 .356 .357
Observations 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082
All speciﬁcations include year-MSA interactions.
Coeﬃcient estimates are marginal eﬀects, at sample means.
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
Signiﬁcant at: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
17Table 4: Multinomial logit models of securitization–agency securitized
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Jumbo -1.02 -.999 -1.05 -.1.07
(.010)*** (.009)*** (.010)*** (.011)***
ARM -.282 -.255 -.260 -.261
(.012)*** (.009)*** (.011)*** (.011)***
Option ARM -.187 -.153 -.192 -.192
(.025)*** (.025)*** (.021)*** (.021)***
Loan-to-value -.245 -.188 -.220 -.206
(.032)*** (.026)*** (.020)*** (.023)***
Subprime -1.63 -1.39 -1.42 -1.41
(.080)*** (.055)*** (.057)*** (.059)***
FICO .001 1.29e(-4) 3.43e(-4) 2.86e(-4)
(1.12e(-4))*** (2.87e(-5))*** (1.34e(-5))*** (2.02e(-5))***
Low/no documentation -.147 .012 -.044 -.043
(.013)*** (.005)*** (.005)*** (.005)***
Low equity ratio .017 -.139 -.146
(.010)* (.012)*** (.012)***
Low-mid equity ratio -.031 -.208 -.214
(.011)*** (.021)*** (.022)***
High-mid equity ratio -.175 -.425 -.429
(.008)*** (.014)*** (.014)***
Low nonperforming loan ratio .160 .197 .205
(.013)*** (.023)*** (.023)***
Low-mid nonperforming loan ratio .160 .167 .176
(.014)*** (.020)*** (.021)***
High-mid nonperforming loan ratio .197 .285 .292
(.016)*** (.023)*** (.024)***
Past 2yr house price apprec. .145 -.297
(.106) (.028)***
Pseudo R2 .302 .089 .076 .052 .320 .356 .357
Observations 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082 1,643,082
All speciﬁcations include year-MSA interactions.
Coeﬃcient estimates are marginal eﬀects, at sample means.
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
Signiﬁcant at: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
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Alternatively, a mortgage can terminate via a prepayment, either because the borrower is selling
the house or because they are reﬁnancing the mortgage. Mortgages that remain current at the end
of the sample period are treated as censored observations. Once a terminating event has occurred,
the mortgage history is complete. We do not follow loans that default and then cure at some time
in the future.
The hazard rate for termination risk j, hj(t) is the probability that the borrower terminates
the mortgage at time T by termination type j, conditional on surviving to time t,
hj(t) = lim
!0
Pr(t < T  T + ;jjT  t)

:
In the literature it is common to assume a proportional hazard framework where the conditional
hazard function is factored into a “baseline” hazard hb
j that is a function of t alone, and a function
(x;j) that incorporates explanatory variables related to the hazard of interest. That is, the
covariates shift the relative risk of failure but they do not aﬀect the underlying shape of the hazard
function. Note that the parameter vector j is indexed by j, reﬂecting the way that covariates are
19allowed to impact the two hazards (default and prepayment) in diﬀerent ways. We assume that
the function  takes an exponential form so that the hazard is given by,
hj(tjx) = hb
j(t)exp(xj):
This speciﬁcation lends itself to a fairly straightforward interpretation of the eﬀects of the covariates
on the hazard rate. Consider two mortgage histories A and B with x’s that diﬀer only in that one
history (history A) has a one unit increase in a single covariate xs. In comparing the hazard
functions of these two mortgage histories, the hazard ratio,
hj(tjxA)
hj(tjxB), takes the simple form ejs.
A hazard ratio greater than one (less than one) indicates an estimated increase (decrease) in
termination probability associated with that particular covariate.11
In all of the speciﬁcations explored here, we construct a current LTV by applying the house price
appreciation of the relevant zip code-level house price index from Zillow to the reported LTV at
origination. For FRMs, the interest rate variable is time-varying, and equal to the diﬀerence between
the ﬁxed rate on the mortgage and the current 30-year rate as given by the Freddie Mac mortgage
market survey. For ARMs the interest rate varies according to the contracted reset schedule. Thus,
we construct our interest rate variable somewhat diﬀerently, by taking reported “ARM margin rate”
which measures the spread the borrower must pay over and above the benchmark rate and adding
to it the current one-year ARM rate reported Freddie Mac. We then take the diﬀerence between
this sum and the current 30-year FRM. Thus, a decline in this variable reﬂects a ﬂattening of the
yield curve which would tend to induce borrowers to reﬁnance out of ARMs and into FRMs. We
also employ a set of static covariates, including those used in the securitization regressions in the
previous section, additional controls for the documentation status of the mortgage, and indicators










where i denotes a history, j = 1;::;m denotes the types of termination, kj denotes the number of subjects in the
data with termination type j, and R(tji) denotes the set of observations exposed to risk j after t periods of history.
The likelihood function is “partial” in the sense that the method produces consistent estimates of the s without
a simultaneous estimation of the baseline hazard. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details. We performed the
maximization using routines written for Stata 11.
20for whether the ARM is an option ARM or an interest-only loan. We also include indicator variables
for whether the initial LTV was exactly equal to 80%. Given the large number of loans in our sample
with exactly 80% LTV and the rapid rise in house prices in California and the rise in the jumbo
loan share, it is certainly possible that some of these loans with 80% LTV actually understate
true borrower leverage because of the existence of a second-lien mortgage that we do not observe.
We also include a measure of local banking market competition, the deposit concentration in the
market. Finally, we include the local house price appreciation over the past two years leading up to
the loan origination as a way to control for markets which may have experienced a housing market
bubble that proceeded to burst.
Since the estimation of competing risks models is resource-intensive, the results below reﬂect
estimation on a 20 percent random sample of our data set. In all the hazard model tables we report
hazard ratios with p-values in parentheses. The reported results are for the default hazard. We
report the results for the prepayment hazard in the appendix. Since prepayment is a competing risk
to default and since prepayment speeds can be quite diﬀerent between borrowers with FRMs and
ARMs, we estimate the hazard models separately for these types of borrowers. The main results
are in Tables 5 and 6.
The results generally conform with the unconditional results as well as our expectations about
the role of risk factors. In terms of observable risk factors, the current LTV is a strong predictor
of default. In all the speciﬁcations considered here, for both FRMs and ARMs, we see that a ten
percentage point increase in current LTV raises the default hazard by about 30 percent. This is
intuitive, of course; we would predict borrowers to be more inclined to default on their mortgages
when their equity in their homes goes down. This could be due to strategic (rational) default, or
could simply reﬂect the fact that homeowners who have suﬀered some sort of life event will have
a more diﬃcult time avoiding default if they cannot sell their houses for enough to repay their
mortgages.
All borrowers with current mortgage rates that are high relative to current market rates are
more likely to default. This could be because falling market rates in our sample are associated with
bad economic times and an increased likelihood of suﬀering some kind of life event, like job loss or
21some other kind of income shock. Alternatively, in our competing risks framework, it is helpful to
remember that borrowers are more likely to prepay their mortgages when their current mortgage
rates are high relative to the market (see also the appendix for the estimates of the prepayment
models). The positive relationship between the incentive to prepay and the default hazard suggests
that there is some heterogeneity in borrowers that is observable to lenders but not to the empirical
researcher. Apparently, borrowers are more likely to default when they have incentive to prepay,
but were somehow prevented from exercising this option.
Other risk factors shift the hazard ratio in the expected manner. For example, borrowers with
exactly 80% LTV at origination have higher default probabilities, consistent with the notion that
these borrowers may have a second lien mortgage. The FICO score is negatively related to default,
as expected. But there are important diﬀerences across FRMs and ARMs. For borrowers with
FRMs, the subprime and low-documentation indicators are not signiﬁcantly related to default.
For ARMs, subprime borrowers have much higher default hazards than non-subprime borrowers,
possibly because subprime borrowers are more vulnerable to income and employment shocks. Also,
ARM borrowers with less-than-complete documentation on their loans default at a faster rate than
borrowers that provided full documentation. This point seems intuitive as well; borrowers who
do not disclose certain ﬁnancial data to lenders and are therefore willing to pay higher loan rates
are probably going to be diﬀerent from borrowers who provide full documentation. However, it is
curious that borrowers choosing FRMs and also choosing not to provide full documentation did not
have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent default rates than the average FRM borrower.
The main variable of interest in the hazard model analysis, however, is the investor-type variable,
which is equal to one if the loan was privately securitized. We also constructed a dummy variable
indicating whether the mortgage was securitized by one of the GSEs. For FRMs, the private
securitization variable is either insigniﬁcant or signiﬁcant but with the unexpected sign (less likely
to default than retained mortgages). Loans securitized with the GSEs have signiﬁcantly lower
default hazard rates, even after controlling for all the risk factors.
The best evidence for diﬀerential performance of privately securitized loans is for ARMs.12. In
12See also Elul (2011) for a similar result
22most of the speciﬁcations in Table 6, the privately securitized ARMs are estimated to have default
rates in the range of 13%-16% higher than otherwise identical loans. To put this in perspective,
with an ARM default rate of 9.9% in our sample, privately securitized ARMs are estimated to have
default rates about 1.3-1.6 percentage points higher than ARMs retained in the portfolio. Note
that the hazard ratios for the GSE and privately securitized ARMs are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than
1.0 in all speciﬁcations considered in table 6, so that investor type is estimated to be statistically
signiﬁcant for ARM loan performance even after controlling for our chosen risk factors. However,
the maximized log (pseudo)likelihoods of the estimated models change little when including the
investor type variables. For example, in the most naive speciﬁcations where default depends solely
on current LTV, the LTV80 indicator, and the interest rate variable (column (i) of Table 6), the
model log likelihood increases by less than .1 percent after including the investor type variables
(column (ii) of Table 6). Indeed, observable risk factors such as current LTV and the subprime and
documentation status are estimated to have a much much larger eﬀect on the default hazard than
investor type.
6 Price Regressions
While the results from the default rate analysis indicate that privately securitized loans–in particular
ARMs–performed worse than retained loans with similar observable risk characteristics, this does
not necessarily imply that lenders passed on loans they knew to be of low quality but investors
did not or that the option to securitize undermines lender incentives to screen borrowers. If we
assume that, ex ante, every mortgage has a positive probability of being retained, then we can use
mortgage interest rates to help make this determination. Say, for example, that lenders know the
borrower’s payment-to-income ratio, but neither we nor investors do. Suppose, further, that lenders
tend to securitize mortgages with high payment-to-income ratios and that the payment-to-income
ratio is positively correlated with default. Then, given that, ex ante, for any mortgage, there is a
chance that the lender will retain it, the loan rate on securitized loans should be higher than the
loan rate on retained loans, controlling for risk characteristics that we can observe. If, on the other
hand, conditional contract rates on securitized mortgages do not turn out to be higher than rates
23Table 5: Competing Risks Models: FRM Default Hazard
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Current LTV 1.027 1.027 1.027 1.027 1.024 1.023 1.024
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
LTV 80% at orig. 1.222 1.224 1.259 1.257 1.304 1.305 1.298
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Rate diﬀerential 2.531 2.527 2.531 2.506 1.978 1.981 2.033
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
GSE .957 .824 .834 .773
(.60) (.01)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Priv. investor .953 1.026 .881 .858
(.447) (.771) (.01)*** (.00)***
Jumbo .715 .619 .861
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.05)**
Subprime 1.142 1.102 .994
(.15) (.33) (.95)
FICO Score .986 .986 .986
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***




Past 2yr House 1.533
price apprec. (.00)***
Log pseudolikelihood -56,373 -56,373 , -56,339 -56,324 -54,956 -54,950 -54,920
Number of observations 2,838,717 2,838,717 2,838,717 2,838,717 2,838,717 2,838,717 2,838,717
Number subjects 200,317 200,317 200,317 200,317 200,317 200,317 200,317
Hazard ratios with p-values in parentheses
Signiﬁcance: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
24Table 6: Competing Risks Models: ARM Default Hazard
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Current LTV 1.031 1.031 1.031 1.031 1.031 1.031 1.030
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Rate diﬀerential 1.854 1.816 1.863 1.820 1.538 1.513 1.512
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
GSE .903 .829 .981 .895
(.04)** (.00)*** (.68) (.06)*
Priv. investor 1.131 1.138 1.163 1.156
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
80% LTV at orig. 1.575 1.558 1.571 1.550 1.652 1.639 1.628
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Jumbo .904 .863 .920
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.01)**
Subprime 1.295 1.268 1.260
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
FICO Score .993 .993 .993
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***




Past 2yr House 1.085
price apprec. (.65)
Option ARM 1.261 1.259 1.165
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Interest only 1.119 1.146 1.311
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Log pseudolikelihood -128,501 -128,474 -128,432 -128,391 -127,715 -127,689 -127,613
Number of observations 1,243,210 1,243,210 1,243,210 1,243,210 1,243,210 1,243,210 1,243,210
Number subjects 125,938 125,938 125,938 125,938 125,938 125,938 125,938
Hazard ratios with p-values in parentheses
Signiﬁcance: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
25on retained mortgages, then we might doubt that lenders knowingly exploited private information
or deliberately failed to thoroughly screen borrowers whose loans were likely to be securitized.
Admittedly, this investigation is not easy to implement given the complexity of the mortgage
pricing problem. The risk of a mortgage loan depends not just on credit factors, but also on the
likelihood that borrowers will prepay the loan early through a reﬁnancing. We take a number of
steps to attempt to control for diﬀerences in reﬁnancing propensity. We include only loans with a
thirty-year term. We consider FRMs and ARMs separately, given the diﬀerent prepayment speeds
on these loans and the likely eﬀect this will have on loan pricing. We also include indicators for
loans with balloon payments, the number of months until the scheduled balloon payment, and a
variable indicating if the loan has a prepayment penalty.
Our loan price measure is the spread of the contract rate on the loan over a benchmark interest
rate. This measure is straightforward to construct for FRMs. Given our sole focus on 30-year
mortgages, the spread is the loan rate less the average yield on the 10-year constant maturity
Treasury note in the quarter of the origination. For ARMs, the pricing is more complicated. We
use the margin rate on the loan, which is literally the spread between the loan rate at the time of
an interest rate reset and the stated benchmark.13
We test for an eﬀect of securitization on loan prices in two diﬀerent ways. In the ﬁrst, we run a
simple OLS regression of the spread of mortgage i originated in year t on our complete set of risk
factors X,
sprit = a + bXit + eit:
Here, the set of risk proxies in X include the securitization indicator as well as many of the same
variables used throughout the empirical analysis: jumbo loan status, LTV at origination, credit
score, documentation status, a subprime loan indicator, and market-speciﬁc control variables such
as the MSA-level deposit concentration measure and the past two years of house price appreciation.
For ARMs, we also include an indicator for option ARMs and for the benchmark loan rate that
13Note that unlike the FRM spread, the spread on an ARM may be relative to a rate that is not risk free (e.g.,
LIBOR). Recall that we used the same margin rate in our construction of the current mortgage rate variable that
went into the default risk modeling
26the ARM rate is tied to. Finally, for the OLS regressions, we include a set of year-MSA interaction
terms.
The second empirical approach attempts to control for possible endogeneity between loan pricing
spreads and securitization for reasons other than risk. For example, if the securitization decision
is at least partially driven by regulatory capital requirement considerations, then the existence of
a capital charge for retained mortgages would tend to drive up loan rates on these mortgages.
To address this type of endogeneity, we adopt the approach in Maddala (1983) for estimating
simultaneous equation models with both continuous and limited dependent endogenous variables.
We implement the model as in Keshk (2003). The ﬁrst equation in the system is the linear model
of the loan spreads discussed above, minus the investor type indicator as an explanatory variable.
The second equation in the system is a probit model of securitization,
Pr(yit = 1) = F(Xit;Zit;);
where y is an 0-1 variable indicating whether the loan was privately securitized or not, F is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function, and  is a vector of parameters. The variables
in X are the same risk factors from the spread regression above (less the securitization indicator, of
course). The variables in the matrix Z are instruments that consist of both MSA-speciﬁc and bank-
speciﬁc variables. The MSA-speciﬁc variables are the average ROA, equity capital-to-assets ratio,
and asset size of the banks with loans in the MSA and the mortgage loan concentration measure
for the MSA in that year. We also use bank-speciﬁc instruments consisting of the same equity
capital-to-asset ratio and nonperforming loan ratio category variables we used in the securitization
regressions in Section , as well as a variable indicating whether the bank has a branch in the MSA
in which the property is located.
For these instruments to be valid, we are eﬀectively assuming that they aﬀect the propensity of
lenders to securitize, but do not aﬀect loan pricing. For example, a bank may choose to securitize a
loan or not based on its current capital ratio, but local market conditions demand that the loan price
charged by the bank is not aﬀected by the capital ratio of the lender. Both models are estimated in
a ﬁrst stage using all the exogenous data. Then the predicted values from each model are included
27in a second stage. Below we report the coeﬃcients from the second stage OLS regressions under
the (IV) columns.
We look for diﬀerences in loan rates in three diﬀerent ways. First, we compare all securitized
loans to retained loans (Table 7). Second, we compare loans securitized through the GSEs to all
other loans (Table 8). This second set of regressions is motivated by the argument that privately
securitized loans and retained loans are more similar to each other in terms of ex-ante risk factors
than they are to the loans sent to the GSEs. Finally, we restrict the sample to only privately-
securitized loans or loans retained by the banks (Table 9).
On balance, we see many of the same qualitative results in the pricing regressions as we saw in the
default analysis. Virtually all of the risk factors have the expected signs: higher LTVs, lower FICO
scores, low documenation, and subprime status all result in higher loan spreads at origination. One
of the most interesting things about these sets of regressions is to compare how loan pricing changes
across the FRMs and the ARMs. For a variable such as LTV, which we found to be extremely
important for explaining defaults, for most of our sample there is little diﬀerence across FRMs and
ARMs in the way that higher LTVs impact the loan rate (see Tables 7 and 8). For example, in
Table 7 we see that under the OLS estimates, lenders required an estimated 22 basis points for
an extra percentage point of LTV for both FRMs and ARMs. Since we have MSA-level variables
in our regression that should proxy for expectations about future local economic conditions, this
result seems to indicate that lenders did not perceive large diﬀerences in the propensity to default
across FRM and ARM borrowers. When we drop the mortgages securitized by the GSEs, however,
fairly large diﬀerences emerge (Table 9). In this riskier subsample, it appears that lenders charged
signiﬁcantly more for an extra percentage point of LTV when oﬀering a FRM compared to an
ARM.
There are also large diﬀerences between the pricing of FRMs and ARMs that are labeled as
subprime. The subprime label, of course, is a summary measure that embeds a great deal of
information about borrower and loan characteristics, some of which the econometrician does not
observe. It is diﬃcult to make “holding all other factors constant” statements when varying the
subprime measure. However, in the subsample containing only privately securitized and retained
28Table 7: Loan price regressions
FRMs (OLS) FRMs (IV) ARMs (OLS) ARMs (IV)
LTV .226 .252 .221 .233
(.004) (.004)*** (.007)*** (.009)***
LTV80% .027 .016 .061 .082
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)***
Securitized .186 .008
(.002)*** (.002)***
Securitized (IV) .081 -.391
(.001)*** (007)***
Origination amount (logs) -.126 -.121 -.005 -.103
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)* (.004)***
Jumbo .212 .242 -.041 -.199
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)*** (.005)***
Subprime .742 .758 2.422 2.521
(.007)*** (.008)*** (.005)*** (.007)***
FICO -.001 -9.92e-4 -.002 -.002
(1.05e-5)*** (1.15e-5)*** (1.84e-5)*** (2.53e-5)***
Low/no documentation .080 .073 .077 .107
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.002)*** (.003)***
Local HHI (deposits) 3.91e-4 -2.67e-5 3.27e-4 -7.27e-6
(1.49e-4)*** (2.17e-6)*** (1.011) (4.51e-6)
Past 2yr House price apprec. -.501 -.281 .107 -.029
(.005)*** (.004)*** (.009)*** (.008)***
Option ARM .230 .160
(.002)*** (.003)***
Interest only -.127 -.230
(.003)*** (.004)***
Prepayment penalty .094 .117 .402 .392
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)*** (.003)***
Months to reset -4.13e-4 4.85e-4
(4.08e-5)*** (5.54e-5)***
OLS speciﬁcations include year-MSA interactions.
IV speciﬁcations include year dummies
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
R2 .155 .143 .563 .564
Observations 656,417 656,417 533,864 414,430
Signiﬁcant at: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
29Table 8: Loan price regressions: GSE securitizations
FRMs (OLS) FRMs (IV) ARMs (OLS) ARMs (IV)
LTV .215 .252 .221 .214
(.004)*** (.004)*** (.007)*** (.026)***
LTV80% .031 .016 .061 .139
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.002)*** (.009)***
GSE .057 .008
(.002)*** (.002)***
GSE (IV) .053 .604
(.003)*** (021)***
Origination amount (logs) -.125 -.121 -.005 .134
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)* (.011)***
Jumbo .239 .335 -.041 1.525
(.002)*** (.008)*** (.003)*** (.055)***
Subprime .767 .885 2.422 4.074
(.007)*** (.011)*** (.005)*** (.100)***
FICO -.001 -.001 -.002 -.003
(1.05e-5)*** (1.08e-5)*** (1.84e-5)*** (7.36e-5)***
Low/no documentation .088 .093 .077 .122
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.002)*** (.007)***
Local HHI (deposits) 4.04e-4 -3.12e-5 3.27e-4 8.16e-5
(1.49e-4)*** (2.04e-6)*** (1.011) (1.31e-5)***
Past 2yr House price apprec. -.502 -.248 .107 .238
(.005)*** (.004)*** (.009)*** (.024)***
Option ARM .230 .210
(.002)*** (.009)***
Interest only -.127 .060
(.003)*** (.012)***
Prepayment penalty .094 .120 .402 1.112
(.002)*** (.002)*** (.003)*** (.026)***
Months to reset -4.13e-4 -.008
(4.08e-5)*** (2.98e-4)***
OLS speciﬁcations include year-MSA interactions.
IV speciﬁcations include year dummies
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
R2 .148 .137 .569 .564
Observations 656,417 656,417 533,864 414,430
Signiﬁcant at: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
30Table 9: Loan price regressions: retained and private-securitizations only
FRMs (OLS) FRMs (IV) ARMs (OLS) ARMs (IV)
LTV .006 .048 .353 .422
(.008) (.011)*** (.009)*** (.013)***
LTV80% .070 .063 .052 .093
(.003)*** (.005)*** (.003)*** (.004)***
Priv. securitized .140 .017
(.003)*** (.002)***
Priv. securitized (IV) .086 -.484
(.003)*** (007)***
Origination amount (logs) -.058 -.062 -.018 -.088
(.004)*** (.005)*** (.003)*** (.004)***
Jumbo .208 .172 -.091 .062
(.004)*** (.006)*** (.004)*** (.005)***
Subprime .643 .645 2.261 2.481
(.009)*** (.013)*** (.006)*** (.009)***
FICO -.001 -.001 -.003 -.002
(2.38e-5)*** (3.49e-5)*** (2.25e-5)*** (3.23e-5)***
Low/no documentation .160 .145 .111 .171
(.003)*** (.004)*** (.002)*** (.003)***
Local HHI (deposits) .001 -3.74e-5 .001 2.26e-5
(3.83e-4)* (6.53e-6) (1.182) (5.96e-6)**
Past 2yr House price apprec. -.428 -.181 .129 .097
(.011)*** (.012)*** (.011)*** (.011)***
Option ARM .174 .019
(.003)*** (.005)***
Interest only -.185 -.286
(.003)*** (.005)***
Prepayment penalty .193 .190 .412 .531
(.004)*** (.005)*** (.003)*** (.004)***
Months to reset -.001 -.001
(5.05)*** (7.08e-5)***
OLS speciﬁcations include year-MSA interactions.
IV speciﬁcations include year dummies
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
R2 .205 .189 .579 .584
Observations 191,256 191,256 414,430 414,430
Signiﬁcant at: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
31mortgages, it is striking how much more sensitive the loan pricing is for ARMs than for FRMs.
Evidently, lenders perceived there to be large diﬀerences in the risk of subprime borrowers who
selected FRMs versus ARMs.
Regarding the securitization variable, the results from the pricing regressions indicate that the
coeﬃcient on securitization is statistically signiﬁcant and positive for FRMs, and signiﬁcant and
negative for ARMs. The loan rate spreads in the analysis are recorded as percentage points. Thus,
in the IV regressions (panel (ii) for FRMs and panel (iv) for ARMs) of Table 9, privately securitized
mortgage loans commanded spreads that were on average about 8 basis points higher than retained
FRMs and nearly 50 basis points lower for ARMs, respectively.
The positive correlation between securitization and the loan spread for FRMs, even in the
presence of our risk factors and control variables, suggests that there may have been some risk
factors that were positively correlated with securitization probability that lenders were aware of,
but investors were not and for which we cannot control. However, this result still leaves open the
possibility that investors themselves may have received, even if by happenstance, a fair return on
their securities. We cannot know from this analysis whether that was true. Such a question can
only be examined with the aid of a fully speciﬁed asset pricing model. But the fact that we found no
meaningful diﬀerences in default rates for securitized FRMs would seem to point against conﬁdent
claims that securitization exacerbated agency conﬂicts between lenders and investors for FRMs.
For ARMs, the lower rates for securitized mortgages also point against claims of agency conﬂicts
in connection with securitization.
7 Conclusion
We use a large loan-level data set of California mortgages to explore the factors behind the choices
lenders made for funding residential mortgages during the U.S. housing boom in the 2000s. During
the sample period under consideration, lenders appear to have securitized loans through private-
label transactions that were in many ways observably riskier than the loans they retained in their
portfolios. Thus, the results appear to be consistent with a story that lenders securitize loans in
part to shed risks that are costly to hold on their balance sheets.
32Given the ﬁnding that private-label securitization are associated with the funding of riskier
mortgages, and given the disastrous loan performance of California mortgages towards the end of the
2000s, one obvious question is whether the growth of private-label securitization somehow eroded
underwriting standards, perhaps by exacerbating the many potential agency problems endemic to
mortgage loan production. After controlling for observable risk factors and for prepayment risk, our
work generally supports the notion that the most important indicators of mortgage default remain
the set of classic risk factors such as LTV at origination, adverse changes in house prices, and the
collection of attributes that result in borrowers being given the subprime classiﬁcation. We do ﬁnd
some evidence that privately securitized ARMs had higher default rates than retained ARMs, but
that these diﬀerences are not due to privately observed risk factors that would be captured in loan
rates. Indeed, we ﬁnd that after controlling for endogeneity in the loan pricing and securitization
choice, rates on securitized ARMs were actually lower than for retained ARMs.
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34Table 10: Competing Risks Models: Prepayment Hazard
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Current LTV .980 1.039 1.032 1.032 1.032 1.031 1.031
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Rate diﬀerential 1.701 1.151 1.678 1.677 1.478 1.477 1.485
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Priv. investor 1.116 1.026 .892 .915
(.436) (.771) (.153) (.283)
80% LTV at orig. 1.462 1.475 1.584 1.579 1.576 1.596 1.637
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Jumbo .621 .619 .764
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Subprime .671 .665 .619
(.003)*** (.002)*** (.001)***
FICO Score .990 .990 .990
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***




Past 2yr House 1.143
price apprec. (.471)
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
Log pseudolikelihood -7,039.3 -7,039.1 -7,018.4 -7,018.4 -6,934.1 -6,933.4 -6,922.9
Number of observations 114,744 114,744 114,744 114,744 114,744 114,744, 114,744
Number subjects 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111
Signiﬁcance: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
35Table 11: Competing Risks Models: FRM Prepayment Hazard
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Current LTV .989 1.032 1.032 1.032 1.032 1.031 1.031
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Rate diﬀerential 1.575 1.703 1.678 1.677 1.478 1.477 1.485
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Priv. investor .978 1.026 .892 .915
(.436) (.771) (.153) (.283)
80% LTV at orig. 1.434 1.475 1.584 1.579 1.576 1.596 1.637
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Jumbo .621 .619 .764
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Subprime .671 .665 .619
(.003)*** (.002)*** (.001)***
FICO Score .990 .990 .990
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***




Past 2yr House 1.143
price apprec. (.471)
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
Log pseudolikelihood -159,765 -7,039.1 -7,018.4 -7,018.4 -6,934.1 -6,933.4 -6,922.9
Number of observations 808,795 114,744 114,744 114,744 114,744 114,744, 114,744
Number subjects 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111 13,111
Signiﬁcance: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
36Table 12: Competing Risks Models: ARM Prepayment Hazard
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Current LTV 1.04 1.04 1.035 1.035 1.037 1.037 1.036
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Rate diﬀerential 1.137 1.135 1.212 1.210 1.015 1.015 1.015
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Priv. investor 1.153 1.089 1.072 1.053
(.045)** (.089)* (.28) (.355)
80% LTV at orig. 1.494 1.489 1.621 1.615 1.642 1.639 1.645
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Jumbo .654 .654 .915
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.015)**
Option ARM 3.072 3.058 1.991
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
Subprime 2.388 2.377 1.736
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
FICO Score .990 .990 .991
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***




Past 2yr House 1.106
price apprec. (.578)
Standard errors clustered by MSA.
Log pseudolikelihood -29,922.6 -29,916.8 -29,409.1 -29,407.0 -29,099 -29,097.7 -28,973.1
Number of observations 223,071 223,071 223,071 223,071 223,071 223,071 223,071
Number subjects 27,626 27,626 27,626 27,626 27,626 27,626 27,626
Signiﬁcance: .01(***), .05(**), .1(*).
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